{"id":79,"date":"2011-11-30T17:56:40","date_gmt":"2011-12-01T01:56:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/facingthesing.wpengine.com\/?p=79"},"modified":"2014-12-01T13:02:02","modified_gmt":"2014-12-01T21:02:02","slug":"the-laws-of-thought","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/2011\/the-laws-of-thought\/","title":{"rendered":"Tankelagarna"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"qtranxs-available-languages-message qtranxs-available-languages-message-sv\">Tyv\u00e4rr \u00e4r denna artikel enbart tillg\u00e4nglig p\u00e5 <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-en\" title=\"English\">English<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-fr\" title=\"Fran\u00e7ais\">Fran\u00e7ais<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-ru\" title=\"\u0440\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439\">\u0440\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-sk\" title=\"Sloven\u010dina\">Sloven\u010dina<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-zh\" title=\"\u4e2d\u6587\">\u4e2d\u6587<\/a> och <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\" class=\"qtranxs-available-language-link qtranxs-available-language-link-it\" title=\"Italiano\">Italiano<\/a>.<\/p><p><span class=\"dropcap\">I<\/span>f someone doesn\u2019t agree with me on the laws of logic, probability theory, and decision theory, then I won\u2019t get very far with them in discussing the intelligence explosion because they\u2019ll end up arguing that human intelligence runs on magic, or that a machine will only become more benevolent as it becomes more intelligent, or that it\u2019s simple to specify what humans want, or some other bit of foolishness. So, let\u2019s make sure we agree on the basics before we try to agree about more complex matters.<\/p>\n<h3>Logic<\/h3>\n<p>Luckily, not many people disagree about logic. As with math, we might make mistakes out of ignorance, but once someone shows us the <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Pythagorean_theorem#Proofs\"><em>proof<\/em><\/a> for the Pythagorean theorem or for the invalidity of <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Affirming_the_consequent\">affirming the consequent<\/a>, we agree. Math and logic are <em>deductive<\/em> systems, where the conclusion of a successful argument follows <em>necessarily<\/em> from its premises, given the axioms of the system you\u2019re using: number theory, geometry, predicate logic, etc. (Of course, one cannot fully escape uncertainty: Andrew Wiles\u2019 <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wiles%27_proof_of_Fermat%27s_Last_Theorem\">famous proof<\/a> of Fermat\u2019s Last Theorem is over one hundred pages long, so even if I worked through the whole thing myself I wouldn\u2019t be certain I hadn\u2019t made a mistake somewhere.)<\/p>\n<p>Why should we let the laws of logic dictate our thinking? There needn\u2019t be anything spooky about this. The laws of logic are baked into how we\u2019ve agreed to talk to each other. If you tell me the car in front of you is 100% red and at the same time and in the same way 100% blue, then the problem isn\u2019t so much that you\u2019re \u201coperating under different laws of logic,\u201d but rather that we\u2019re speaking different languages. Part of what I <em>mean<\/em> when I say that the car in front of me is \u201c100% red\u201d is that it isn\u2019t also 100% blue in the same way at the same time. If you disagree, then we\u2019re not speaking the same language. You\u2019re speaking a language that uses many of the same sounds and spellings as mine but doesn\u2019t mean the same things.<\/p>\n<p>But logic is a system of certainty, and our world is one of uncertainty. In our world, we need to talk not about certainties but about <em>probabilities<\/em>.<\/p>\n<h3>Probability Theory<\/h3>\n<p>Give a child religion first, and she may find it hard to shake even when she encounters science. Give a child science first, and when she discovers religion it will look silly.<\/p>\n<p>For this reason, I will explain the correct theory of probability first, and only later mention the incorrect theory.<\/p>\n<p>What is probability? It\u2019s a measure of how likely a proposition is to be true, given what else you believe. And whatever our theory of probability is, it should be consistent with common sense (for example, consistent with logic), and it should be consistent with itself (if you can calculate a probability with two methods, both methods should give the same answer).<\/p>\n<p>Several authors have shown that the axioms of probability theory can be derived from these assumptions plus logic.<a id=\"fn1x7-bk\" href=\"#fn1x7\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><sup>,<\/sup><a id=\"fn2x7-bk\" href=\"#fn2x7\"><sup>2<\/sup><\/a> In other words, probability theory is just an extension of logic. If you accept logic, and you accept the above (very minimal) assumptions about what probability is, then whether you know it or not you have accepted probability theory.<\/p>\n<p>Another reason to accept probability theory is this (roughly speaking): If you don\u2019t, and you are willing to take bets on your beliefs being true, then someone who <em>is<\/em> using probability theory can take all your money. (For the proof, look into Dutch Book arguments.<a id=\"fn3x7-bk\" href=\"#fn3x7\"><sup>3<\/sup><\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps the most useful rule to be derived from the axioms of probability theory is Bayes\u2019 Theorem, which tells you exactly how your probability for a statement should change as you encounter new information. (In the <a href=\"http:\/\/facingthesing.wpengine.com\/2011\/from-skepticism-to-technical-rationality\/\">cognitive science of rationality<\/a>, many cognitive biases are <em>defined<\/em> in terms of how they violate either basic logic or Bayes\u2019 Theorem.) If you\u2019re not using Bayes\u2019 Theorem to update your beliefs, then you\u2019re violating probability theory, which is an extension of logic.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the human brain is too slow to make explicit Bayesian calculations all day. But you <em>can<\/em> develop mental heuristics that do a better job of approximating Bayesian calculations than many of our default evolved heuristics do.<\/p>\n<p>This is not the place for a full tutorial on <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Concise-Introduction-Logic-Book-Only\/dp\/0840034164\/\">logic<\/a> or <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Probability-Theory-Science-T-Jaynes\/dp\/0521592712\/\">probability theory<\/a> or <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Thinking-Fast-Slow-Daniel-Kahneman\/dp\/0374275637\/\">rationality training<\/a>. I just want to introduce the core tools we\u2019ll be using so I can later explain why I came to one conclusion instead of another concerning the intelligence explosion. Still, you might want to <em>at least<\/em> read this <a href=\"http:\/\/betterexplained.com\/articles\/an-intuitive-and-short-explanation-of-bayes-theorem\/\">short tutorial<\/a> on Bayes\u2019 Theorem before continuing.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, I owe you a quick explanation of why frequentism, the theory of probability you probably learned in school like I did, is wrong. Whereas the Bayesian view sees probability as a measure of uncertainty about the world, frequentism sees probability as \u201cthe proportion of times the event would occur in a long run of repeated experiments.\u201d I\u2019ll mention just two problems with this, out of at least fifteen:<a id=\"fn4x7-bk\" href=\"#fn4x7\"><sup>4<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Frequentism is not derived from the laws of logic, and is not self-consistent. Under frequentism, calculating a probability with two methods can often lead to two different answers.<\/li>\n<li>Frequentism judges probability based not exclusively on <em>what we know<\/em> but also on a long series of hypothetical \u201cexperiments\u201d that we may never observe, and which are only vaguely defined. That is, frequentism abandons empiricism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>If frequentism is wrong, why is it so popular? There are many reasons, reviewed in <a href=\"http:\/\/lesswrong.com\/lw\/774\/a_history_of_bayes_theorem\/\">this book<\/a> about the history of Bayes\u2019 Theorem.<a id=\"fn5x7-bk\" href=\"#fn5x7\"><sup>5<\/sup><\/a> Anyway, when I talk about probability theory, I\u2019ll be referring to Bayesianism.<\/p>\n<h3>Decision Theory<\/h3>\n<p>I explained why there are laws of thought when it comes to epistemic rationality (acquiring true beliefs), and I pointed you to some detailed tutorials. But how can there be laws of thought concerning instrumental rationality (maximally achieving one\u2019s goals)? Isn\u2019t what we want subjective, and therefore not subject to rules?<\/p>\n<p>Yes, you may have any number of goals. But when it comes to maximally <em>achieving<\/em> those goals, there are indeed rules. If you think about it, this should be obvious. Whatever goals you have, there are always really stupid ways to go about trying to achieve them. If you want to know what exists, you shouldn\u2019t bury your head in the sand and refuse to <em>look<\/em> at what exists. And if you want to achieve goals in the world, you probably shouldn\u2019t paralyze your entire body, unless paralysis is your only goal.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s be more specific. Decision theory is about choosing among possible actions based on how much you desire the possible outcomes of those actions.<\/p>\n<p>How does this work? We can describe what you want with something called a <em>utility function<\/em>, which assigns a number that expresses how much you desire each possible outcome (or \u201cdescription of an entire possible future\u201d). Perhaps a single scoop of ice cream has forty \u201cutils\u201d for you, the death of your daughter has -274,000 utils for you, and so on. This numerical representation of everything you care about is your utility function.<\/p>\n<p>We can combine your probabilistic beliefs and your utility function to calculate the <em>expected utility<\/em> for any action under consideration. The expected utility of an action is the average utility of the action\u2019s possible outcomes, weighted by the probability that each outcome occurs.<\/p>\n<p>Suppose you\u2019re walking along a freeway with your young daughter. You see an ice cream stand across the freeway, but you\u2019ve recently injured your leg and wouldn\u2019t be able to move quickly across the freeway. Given what you know, if you send your daughter across the freeway to get you some ice cream, there\u2019s a 60% chance you\u2019ll get some ice cream, a 5% chance your child will be killed by speeding cars, and other probabilities for other outcomes.<\/p>\n<p>To calculate the expected utility of sending your daughter across the freeway for ice cream, we multiply the utility of the first outcome by its probability: 0.6 \u00d7 40 = 24. Then, we add to this the product of the next outcome\u2019s utility and its probability: 24 + (-274,000 \u00d7 0.05) = -13,676. And suppose the sum of the products of the utilities and probabilities for other possible outcomes was zero. The expected utility of sending your daughter across the freeway for ice cream is thus <em>very low<\/em> (as we would expect from common sense). You should probably take one of the other actions available to you, for example the action of <em>not<\/em> sending your daughter across the freeway for ice cream, or some action with even higher expected utility.<\/p>\n<p>A rational agent aims to maximize its expected utility, because an agent that does so will on average get the <em>most possible<\/em> of what it wants, given its beliefs and desires.<\/p>\n<p>It seems intuitive that a rational agent should maximize its expected utility, but why is that the <em>only<\/em> rational way to do things? Why not try to minimize the worst possible loss? Why not try to maximize the weighted sum of the cubes of the possible utilities?<\/p>\n<p>The justification for the \u201cmaximize expected utility\u201d principle was discovered in the 1940s by von Neumann and Morgenstern. In short, they proved that if a few axioms about preferences are accepted, then an agent can only act consistently with its own preferences by choosing the action that maximizes expected utility.<a id=\"fn6x7-bk\" href=\"#fn6x7\"><sup>6<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>What are these axioms? Like the axioms of probability theory, they are simple and intuitive. For example, one of them is the <em>transitivity<\/em> axiom, which says that if an agent prefers A to B, and it prefers B to C, then it must prefer A to C. This axiom is motivated by the fact that someone with nontransitive preferences can be tricked out of all her money even while only making trades that she prefers.<\/p>\n<p>I won\u2019t go into the <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Morgenstern_utility_theorem\">details<\/a> here because this result has been so widely accepted: a rational agent maximizes expected utility.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, humans are not rational agents. As we\u2019ll see in the next chapter, humans are <em>crazy<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"footnotes\">* * *<\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn1x7\" href=\"#fn1x7-bk\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a>E. T. Jaynes, <em>Probability Theory: The Logic of Science<\/em>, ed. G. Larry Bretthorst (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), <span class=\"textrm\">doi<\/span>:<a href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.2277\/0521592712\">10.2277\/0521592712<\/a>.<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn2x7\" href=\"#fn2x7-bk\"><sup>2<\/sup><\/a>Stefan Arnborg and Gunnr Sj\u00f6din, \u201cOn the Foundations of Bayesianism,\u201d <em>AIP Conference Proceedings<\/em> 568, no. 1 (2001): 61\u201371, <a class=\"url\" href=\"http:\/\/connection.ebscohost.com\/c\/articles\/5665715\/foundations-bayesianism\">http:\/\/connection.ebscohost.com\/c\/articles\/5665715\/foundations-bayesianism<\/a>.<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn3x7\" href=\"#fn3x7-bk\"><sup>3<\/sup><\/a>Kenny Easwaran, \u201cBayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor,\u201d <em>Philosophy<\/em> Compass 6 (5 2011): 312\u2013320, <span class=\"textrm\">doi<\/span>:<a href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1111\/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x\">10.1111\/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x<\/a>.<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn4x7\" href=\"#fn4x7-bk\"><sup>4<\/sup><\/a>Alan H\u00e1jek, \u201c\u2018Mises Redux\u2019\u2014Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism,\u201d <em>Erkenntnis<\/em> 45, no. 2 (November 1996): 209\u2013227, <span class=\"textrm\">doi<\/span>:<a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/20012727\">10.1007\/BF00276791<\/a>.<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn5x7\" href=\"#fn5x7-bk\"><sup>5<\/sup><\/a>Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, <em>The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes\u2019 Rule Cracked<\/em> the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a id=\"fn6x7\" href=\"#fn6x7-bk\"><sup>6<\/sup><\/a>John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, <em>Theory of Games and Economic Behavior<\/em>, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947).<\/small><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Tyv\u00e4rr \u00e4r denna artikel enbart tillg\u00e4nglig p\u00e5 English, Fran\u00e7ais, \u0440\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439, Sloven\u010dina, \u4e2d\u6587 och Italiano.f someone doesn\u2019t agree with me on the laws of logic, probability theory, and decision theory, then I won\u2019t get very far with them in discussing the&hellip;  <a href=\"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/2011\/the-laws-of-thought\/\">continue reading<\/a> &raquo;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-79","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-chapter"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intelligenceexplosion.com\/sv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}